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Abstract 
This article examines the critical role played by social identity in the construction of hospitals in the Argentine health care sector 
during the 1940s and 1950s by uncovering the way in which the “jungle” of hospitals withstood attempts by the state to apply 
some sense of order, purpose, and centralized organization. The first section examines how physicians envisioned the “modern” 
hospital they hoped to construct. The second section reveals the important antecedents of nationalized hospitalization schemes 
found in the collaboration between physicians’ unions and the state. In the third section, an analysis of political speeches 
illuminates how Juan and Evita Perón packaged new hospitals as gifts to the people from their leader. The fourth section outlines 
specific plans to increase the number of hospital beds. The final section surveys examples of hospital construction to demonstrate 
how sub-national identities were instrumental to fragmenting both Argentine society and its hospital infrastructure. 
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Cells in the Body Politic:  
Social identity and hospital construction in Peronist Argentina 
 
J. Hagood1 
I. Introduction 
On February 24, 1951, the anniversary of his election victory five years before, Argentine President Juan 
Perón gave a speech inaugurating the newly-completed Policlínico “Presidente Perón” in suburban Buenos Aires in 
which he summarized the Peronist vision for hospitals and their construction, noting the deplorable state of hospitals 
and health care that had existed before: 
The medical institutions for the less favored classes should not be called hospitals but “inhospitables” 
because the primary sentiments are not of hospitality but of the absolute inhospitality that befalls the 
desperate poor in their fight for health and subsistence. A hospital in a civilized society has to be a home 
where pain is dismissed and where man is defended from death with the respect and love with which a human 
being should be defended against disease (Perón, J., 1951a). 
His wife, Evita, had expressed similar sentiments prior to steering her Fundación Eva Perón (FEP) toward 
the construction of medical facilities. In a speech at the Hospital Penna in April 1948, she reported the following 
deficiencies in Argentine hospitals:  
The physicians, nurses, and custodians – all of the staff – make extraordinary efforts, but they cannot avoid 
the difficulties arising from fifty years of abandonment. The equipment hasn’t been modernized, new 
hospitals haven’t been built, and General Perón must begin the work of building workers’ hospitals so that 
the working masses can be attended with dignity (Perón, E., 1948). 
Evita’s comments are significant in that they highlight two components of the overall Peronist scheme for 
hospital construction: existing hospitals suffered from decades of neglect and, therefore, the working class needed 
new medical facilities. These new hospitals would not be “inhospitable” like the medical facilities that existed 
before. By extension, society had also suffered from decades of neglect and, therefore, needed a new, more 
hospitable, Argentina. 
The speeches of Perón and Evita demonstrate the rhetoric surrounding the Peronist vision for hospital 
construction. Again and again, the Peronist public discourse on hospitals and public health connected improvements 
in health care to the needs of the people. Both Perón and Evita emphasized their personal connections to los 
descamisados or to whichever population they happened to address at the time. In this way, hospitals were a gift 
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Perón bestowed upon specific groups of people, each with its own, clearly articulated sub-national identity. As a 
consequence, Peronism claimed ownership of hospital construction undertaken by a wide number of groups: federal 
and provincial governments, quasi-government entities (e.g., the FEP), and mutual aid societies (mutualidades) – 
particularly those of organized labor. 
By the late 1930s, hospitals in Argentina had clearly emerged as the site where the sick received treatment 
as patients, physicians practiced medicine, and medical students learned the skills and knowledge necessary for their 
future careers. A number of general tendencies favored the concentration of health care in hospitals rather than its 
distribution across multiple physicians’ offices. As medical education became a longer and more professional 
experience, internship and residency in a hospital where students could observe a wide variety of diseases and 
patients became a necessary and significant part of the medical student’s experience. As enrollment in medical 
schools increased – particularly after the University Reform of 1918 – the sheer number of medical students 
requiring positions in hospitals supplied new medical facilities with the laborers necessary to staff them. In addition, 
the shift in medical practice towards specialization and teamwork obliged physicians to create a site where the 
consultations and surgeries such forms of medical practice required could take place. Health care also had become 
more dependent upon technologies such as X-rays, laboratory tests, and advanced surgical equipment increasingly 
possible only in a large facility like a hospital. Finally, the economics of health care meant that patients sought the 
lower costs that a large group of physicians or patients could provide. As a result, changes in health care transformed 
the Argentine hospital from the traditional site of charity and convalescence to the location where the diagnosis of 
illness and its cure took place. As El Médico Práctico, a weekly journal for practicing physicians, observed, “the 
concentration of medicine – under the form of hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, public assistance, mutualidades, etc. – 
attracts and absorbs a greater number of patients than could go to the physician’s private office” (“Lo que hemos 
hecho,” 1946, p.1). 
A wide variety of autonomous social groups built hospitals in Argentina, and this contributed to a 
uncoordinated, fragmented, and unevenly developed health care infrastructure. Physician Ubaldo Matera, writing in 
the official publication of the Ministerio de Salud Pública (MSP, Ministry of Public Health, founded in 1947 as the 
Secretaría de Salud Pública), described the situation as follows: 
Today there exist numerous ‘medical services’ directed at the public in the different hospitals and clinics, 
characterized by the most varied denominations: all those dependent upon the [MSP], the provincial and 
municipal governments, and the private charity institutions. The voluntary and obligatory mututalidades have 
a function uniquely restricted to their members, but we can consider them as public services as well. All of 
this progress in collective medical care that completely or partially covers the risk of disease for many 
millions of persons forms a true jungle of institutions without any real connections between them. Their 
technical value, in general, is frequently beneath their objectives and the patient very rarely finds the shortest 
path to recovery (Matera, 1949-50, pp.323-324). 
II. The Modern Hospital 
Argentine physicians of the 1940s believed that the evolution of hospital care over time reflected the 
characteristics of each age and, as a consequence, the most contemporary concept of the hospital was, necessarily, 
“modern” and in tune with current conception of health care. Religious orders had founded the first hospitals in 
Argentina, and, as a consequence, religious criteria dominated the structure of health care up until the 1800s. The 
hospital was a refuge for the sick, old, invalid, and orphaned where material assistance combined with spiritual care. 
Hospitals in Latin America originated as outreach by the Catholic Church, nuns often staffed medical facilities, and 
society generally intended these services for the poor and indigent. Up until the early twentieth century, those who 
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could pay for medical care sought it through the services of an independent physician in his office or at home. In 
1943, Abelardo Irigoyen Freyre, the first minister of Public Health for the Province of Santa Fe, reflected: 
The creation of hospitals of beneficence (charity) and asylums for the poor directed by ladies and gentlemen 
of our society represented the first step towards a rational and modern organization of social services. 
Initially intended as a moral imperative, like an extension of Christian charity, little by little it became 
increasingly important in medical and government circles – to the point that today it is a vital part of social 
medicine and government programs (Freyre, 1943, p.151). 
In the nineteenth century, the professionalization of medicine and the creation of medical schools 
transformed the hospital from a site of Christian charity to the domain of physicians and medical students. Over 
time, the interest in scientific and medical investigation at the hospital and the desire to make precise diagnoses of 
patients combined to emphasize the role of medical instruments, laboratory tests, and pathology. However, many 
physicians believed that the emphasis on diagnosis took medicine away from its curative mission. For example, in 
1940 D.E. Laval presented a paper entitled “El Hospital Moderno” at the first Latin American Conference on 
Hospitals in which he noted: 
In this century there began a new evolution in the concept of hospital care. Limiting the efforts to alleviate 
and cure the sick is insufficient: in almost all illnesses, despite its brilliant progress medical technique is 
inefficient if it is not logically and sufficiently supported by intelligent social action. The patient does not 
want only to be diagnosed with precision and then have his pain treated adequately. He also wants to be 
considered as a human being with a past and a future as well as family, friends, a job, and a physical and 
mental way of life in an environment that isn’t hygienic and whose conditions must be exactly known and 
considered by his physicians (Laval, 1940, p.8). 
A significant part of the modern hospital’s development was its categorization into facilities tiered by the 
scope of its mission. Although the modern hospital grew in size because of medical technology, larger numbers of 
patients and physicians, and the increasing complexity of health care, advocates of modern hospitals and social 
medicine also promoted smaller, community-oriented health clinics. Physicians and bureaucrats ascribed many 
names to these clinics (e.g. centrso de salud, puestos de higiene, and servicios sanitarios), but generally speaking 
the often-used term unidad sanitaria (public health unit or center) reflected the role played by the clinics in rational 
public health planning while allowing for the diversity of missions and configurations. For example, in their 1945 
treatise Hospitales: Unidades Sanitarias physicians Carlos Carreño and N. Alberto Yanzon R. described how “each 
clinic constitutes a complete department of health that centralizes, coordinates, and locates under one office all of 
the public health works and, often, social welfare in one location” (p.143). At the same time, these centers promised 
a radical transfer of public health and medical care from urban to suburban and rural populations. Carreño and 
Yanzon (1945) believed that the unidad sanitaria also promised to “decentralize public health (removing it from the 
capital or large population center) in order better to distribute it and take it to all of the regions of the country” 
(p.143). 
The development of hospitals also reflected the economic reality of practicing physicians. The major 
problem lay in physicians dividing their time between low-paying hospital work and private practice. On purely 
economic terms, neither commitment was sufficient on its own to support a physician. As a consequence, part-time 
physicians generally staffed hospitals. Physicians’ unions – especially those affiliated with specific hospitals – 
repeatedly lobbied for full-time employment while physicians themselves often bemoaned the quality of care part-
time medical professionals provided to patients. El Médico Práctico outlined the obvious solution: 
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What is evident and indisputable is that medical workers – integrated into the hospital – should be full-time 
employees. In this way the hospital would profit as an effective health institution. The patient would profit 
because he would be properly attended. The physician – and all medical workers – would profit because he 
would be properly dedicated to his job without being pulled away by other interests. The patients would not 
resist – as sometimes happens – being admitted because they would know that they would be properly 
attended, certain that the professional was dedicated to their exclusive attention, handing over his heart and 
soul to curing their illness. And this would also establish a permanent attitude of sympathy that is 
increasingly vital between patients and medical workers (“Sobre medicos y hospitales,” 1951, p.1). 
However, as Laval’s description of the modern hospital emphasized, economics did not entirely drive 
prescriptions for developing modern hospitals staffed by full-time physicians. The social mission of the hospitals 
was vitally important. Writing as early as 1938 in Chile, D.G. Fricke responded to the economic argument by 
remarking that those who “propose that in a hospital one must have a technical director and an administrative staff 
forget that a hospital isn’t a commercial establishment that makes a profit or loss, but an establishment of a social 
character; and likewise it must give a social return.” From Fricke’s perspective, “the director of a hospital needs to 
be a director-technician, a physician, and – if possible – a sociologist at the same time” (1938, pp.19-20). 
At the same time, physicians clearly understood and articulated the social mission for physicians beyond 
the hospital walls and the unique role that the hospital or unidad sanitaria could play. Irigoyen Freyre believed that 
“the hospital has an importance already much more transcendental that that of the ancient concept of a place of help, 
a refuge for the sick and diminished. It has a scientific and social mission of much great transcendence. The 
physician is not resigned to waiting for the production of disease in order to go to aid the sick; he tries to save man 
from them” (1943, p.152). Carreño and Yanzon (1945) promoted the notion of the hospital as an institution that 
could “contribute to the collective health, improving the environment in which it works toward the preservation and 
promotion of the health of the community – given that in dedicating its activities to suffering it realizes a 
humanitarian mission and is a genuine product of civilization” (p.14). The physicians went further, maintaining that, 
“the modern hospital is an institution that – like the school and the barracks – prepares the citizenry to fight against a 
specific enemy that in this case is disease” (p.14). In a similar way, Juan Lazarte, a long-time supporter of both the 
unionization of physicians and a strong government role in health care, believed that the well-equipped and staffed 
unidad sanitaria “stops attending only to its admitted patients and extends its services to those not hospitalized” 
(1948, p. 175). 
Antecedents of the Peronist State’s hospital construction plans 
Beginning in 1943, physicians and leaders of the Federación Médica de la República Argentina, the 
national physicians’ union, worked with the Ministry of Labor, then under Perón’ control, as members of a 
commission entrusted with developing plans for federal intervention in public health. On the government side, 
Eugenio Galli, chairman of the Dirección Nacional de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (founded in 1943 and a 
direct precursor of the MSP), had embraced a policy of centralization of authority and planning that would at the 
same time redistribute health care to distant parts of the country. Early on, Galli observed: 
In Buenos Aires there are numerous institutions with their corresponding medical services… that through the 
lack of coordination in their functions limit their sphere of action. With the establishment of a single authority 
it will be possible to coordinate these dispersed efforts and resources and arrive in an expedited form at a 
rational plan of public health that must bring the benefits of hygiene and health to the most remote regions of 
our country (“Editorial: la centralización,” 1943, pp.4-5). 
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Physicians’ union president Victorio Monteverde and fellow leader Luís Tettamanti joined Galli in steering 
the commission toward a plan for both coordinating health care and developing a scheme for the construction of 
hospitals and unidades sanitarias throughout Argentina. The commission’s work also firmly endorsed the eventual 
government takeover of medicine, as the construction of public health facilities throughout the country would have 
provided places of public employment for physicians. 
In the August 1944 edition of the official journal of the physicians’ union, Tettamanti described the plan. 
He argued that the unidades sanitarias would “begin policies of preventive and curative medicine that are the 
fundamental bases” of the project of state-controlled medicine (Tettamanti, 1944, pp.14-15). Each unidad sanitaria 
would serve a population of five thousand with a medical staff made up of general practitioners and surgeons as well 
as specialists, dentists, pharmacists, nurses, social workers, and paramedics. These medical professionals would 
provide care to the sick in the center’s clinic and periodically examine the healthy members of its population. 
Tettamanti noted that the commission was planning a second level of hospitals, tentatively set at one for every thirty 
unidades sanitarias. These secondary public health centers would consist of a hospital, preventive medicine clinics, 
and facilities for surgery, trauma, maternity, and specialties. 
Speaking to the editors of Mundo Médico, another weekly publication for physicians in Buenos Aires, for 
the September 1944 issue, Monteverde provided more details on what the commission later finalized into a three-
tiered organizational structure (“Sobre oficialización, 1944, p.42). As proposed, the bottom tier consisted of 
unidades sanitarias apportioned to every five thousand inhabitants or to a twenty-five-kilometer radius. Where 
population densities did not permit this distribution, the plan envisioned unidades with wider areas of responsibility. 
Each center would provide preventive and curative medical care to its residents through a limited number of beds 
and a health care team whose members would enjoy full-time state employment and annual paid vacations, periods 
of continuing education, and stability through a career ladder. As envisioned, new medical school graduates could 
enter the system after two years of residency at a large urban hospital. 
The middle tier of the commission’s plan accounted for health care facilities on the order of one for every 
thirty unidades. These proposed secondary centers would consist of a 1,500-bed hospital with clinical, surgical, 
trauma, maternity, pediatric, specialist, radiology, physical therapy, and laboratory services along with a blood bank, 
an isolation wing, and clinics for hygiene and preventive medicine. In addition, the secondary center would act as 
the base for a mobile team of specialists serving the needs of the center’s unidades sanitarias. These specialists 
would supplement the general health care provided at the smaller facilities while also allowing for the treatment of 
special cases at the unidades themselves when transportation to the secondary center for hospitalization was 
impossible or unadvisable. 
Regional public health administrations comprised the upper tier in the commission’s proposal. Each 
regional center served the needs of ten secondary centers and the 300 unidades sanitarias underneath them. 
According to Monteverde, the tertiary center’s responsibilities for its region would include: the administration and 
coordination of public health; hospitals for chronic patients, asylums for the mentally ill, and rehabilitation facilities; 
the organization of programs for preventive medicine and sanitation as well as the disinfection and extermination of 
disease vectors; and the planning of engineering projects for public sanitation. In addition, each regional public 
health administration would receive the results of annual health surveys performed by the unidades sanitarias – 
including the creation an index card with health information for each resident – to generate a regional health report 
to be reported to the state.  
The commission did not work in a vacuum, and other physicians published similar ideas on the 
organization of medical facilities. For example, Carreño and Yanzon’s book on hospitals included a section 
outlining a similar hierarchical organization. The authors envisioned unidades sanitarias that covered a wider radius 
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(forty to fifty kilometers) and stressed the importance of placing the secondary centers in areas of “social, economic, 
cultural, and political importance” in order for them to be effective” (Carreño & Yanzon, 1945, p.51). The unidades 
sanitarias would be the centers “towards which all of the socio-medical efforts will converge” (Carreño & Yanzon, 
1945, p.51). In 1944, Perón, then Secretary of Labor, noted in the dedication of a new Tuberculosis Clinic that the 
facility was “the result of our common work in the Secretariat or in Public Health, where a nucleus of modest men 
and workers are realizing a constructive effort that isn’t a perfect ideal but is a necessary archetype for the moment 
in which we live” (Perón, J., 1944a). Clearly, a rational plan for medical facilities fit the needs of physicians’ unions, 
advocates of state-led public health, and political leaders. Still, Perón would later fit hospital construction into his 
own vision of social justice and the need for palpable accomplishments in the health care sector. 
The Peronist vision 
As noted above, for Perón a more “hospitable” clinic would both protect the neediest members of 
Argentine society and educate them in a healthy way of life: “These hospitals of the New Argentina… in order to 
protect our people and especially to protect the poor are also a school. Here the patient should receive not only 
health care but also should see in it an example of a life as hygienic as his home should be: clean, hygienic, and 
dignified” (1951b). As protectors and educators of the working class, a Peronist hospital would not suffer from a 
lack of investment. Perón observed: “Our hospitals worry excessively about economy. How is it possible that in the 
defense of men’s lives we think of economy, when we waste millions on things that have no value and no 
importance? This is why I am very pleased… [that the FEP] has provided for this home with generosity” (1951a). 
Evita also often stressed maximum effort when describing hospital construction. For example, she promised to 
“continue to build other hospitals… In order to help los descamisados argentinos we don’t have to lessen our 
efforts. Physicians, nurses, the governor, the president of the nation, my modest self – we all are fighting together 
for the health of our people” (1948). 
Finally, Perón emphasized again and again the metaphor of the hospital as a home, and in most speeches 
for hospital dedications he entreated the population served by the hospital to take care of the new medical facilities 
constructed for them. For example, in an October 1949 speech dedicating a unidad sanitaria in a rural village in the 
Province of Santa Fe, Perón stated: 
 
I want to make clear to all of you, citizens of San Vicente, that this hospital belongs to you. Take care of it 
and do all that you can to maintain it in its current state of cleanliness, care, and repair with its beautiful park 
where patients in their convalescence can walk. Think of it as a home for all. Most important is to care for it 
because this hospital, here, in San Vicente, isn’t anyone’s but, as I said, everyone’s. Here you will find, 
despite the hardships that illness brings with it, the happiness of being taken care of in your own home in the 
most conscientious way possible because you can trust your health to capable physicians (Perón, J., 1949). 
 
Speaking in August 1952 at the dedication of the FEP’s Policlínico “Evita” (only weeks following her death in July 
1952), Perón urged the assembled crowd of hospital employees, dignitaries, and workers: 
 
I ask that you take care of it, because it is yours; and I ask that the staff of this home take care of it and that 
they bring to it the inspiration and the orientation that Eva Perón gave to all of her works… that each one of 
the humble people of this neighborhood, and of any other neighborhood of the Republic that comes to its 
doors, finds a heart open to taking care of you, soothing your physical and moral pain and that this home is, 
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for many centuries, the representation of the true love that must reign between los argentinos (Perón, J., 
1952). 
III. The Peronist Plan 
The tendency of Peronism directly to engage diverse and autonomous social groups did not prevent Ramón 
Carrillo, the first minister of public health in Argentina, from articulating in the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP) a 
comprehensive and universalizing scheme for hospital construction and organization that in 1947 predated yet did 
not foresee the subsequently fragmented nature of Peronist hospital construction. Instead, Carrillo saw his plan as 
the next logical step within the discourse concerning the health care sector in Argentina. Of primary importance to 
the FFYP and the MSP was the notion that the state could bring organization and planning to solve social problems. 
Speaking at a conference on hospital administration in 1950, Ramón H.P. Ramos, technical sub-director of 
hospitals in the MSP, described the situation as follows: 
The modern state creates the highest organization within each country but also imposes… a special 
mysticism intimately bound to feelings of responsibility. These two principles of order and ethics animate 
and characterize the age of reconstruction in which Argentine public health is working and fundamentally 
differentiates the hospitals of the present from those of the past. Making all social classes equal before 
disease has created technical, economic, social, personnel and construction problems – difficult but not 
unsolvable (Ramos, 1950, p.199). 
Carrillo, Ramos, and the rest of the MSP leadership clearly posited the location of public health problems 
in the nation’s interior and rural areas. The phenomenon of la plétora médica, in which an overabundance of 
physicians crowded urban areas leaving much of rural Argentina without immediate medical assistance, underscored 
the need for state intervention and organization to address social problems largely affecting the rural interior. 
Because of this, the MSP could praise recent developments in health care, social medicine, and medical facilities 
while deploring the over-concentration of these efforts in urban areas – places where the MSP justifiably felt health 
care was already sufficient. For example, Ramos observed that, “the social work of projecting the hospital towards 
the community, initiated twenty years ago in Argentina, had remained relegated only to the most important urban 
centers, leaving the rural centers and sparsely settled areas completely abandoned” (1950, p.196). 
The MSP identified the measure of improvement in the nation’s public health as the number of hospital 
beds in Argentina. This statistic drove MSP planning, public pronouncements, and political lobbying more than rates 
of mortality and fertility, endemic disease, and the number of physicians per capita despite the fact that the uneven 
distribution of physicians and medical professionals was at the center of the health care problem in Argentina. 
Carrillo and the MSP emphasized the construction of hospitals and unidades sanitarias for three reasons: new 
medical facilities would require a wide array of medical professionals; jobs at new facilities would provide 
economic incentives for physicians, nurses, etc. to leave dense urban areas for the rural interior; and new buildings 
would give a concrete example of the state’s interest in the health of its citizens through its palpable projection into 
the rural interior. As a consequence, the number of hospital beds and plans to increase this statistical measure of 
public health guided Carrillo’s policies. 
In their earlier publication, Carreño and Yanzon had stated that the accepted statistical goal was 5 beds per 
1,000 inhabitants (1945, p.15). When Carrillo took control of state-level public health planning in 1946, the number 
of hospital beds in Argentina totaled 66,300 or 4.1 per 1,000 inhabitants in a population of roughly 16 million. 
Clearly, using Carreño and Yanzon’s formulation would mean that Argentina was already close to the number of 
beds necessary, and this would severely lessen the power of the MSP’s argument for new construction outside of 
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urban areas despite the fact that the national statistic hid regional disparities. As a solution, Carrillo and the MSP 
doubled the goal to 10 beds per 1,000 inhabitants. This allowed Carrillo to state that in 1946 Argentina lacked nearly 
100,000 hospital beds. Moreover, this large number also supported his contention that the existing system 
distributed hospitals unevenly and inequitably while needlessly duplicating services in urban areas. 
Carrillo’s proposal for the organization of hospitals and unidades sanitarias built upon the three-tiered plan 
proposed by the commission headed by leaders of the physicians’ union – despite the fact that union leaders were 
largely non-existent in the MSP’s bureaucracy or Carrillo’s inner circle. Carrillo added additional tiers to the top and 
the bottom of the organizational chart. For the uppermost layer, the MSP proposed large urban hospitals of 500 or 
more beds. For the bottom, Carrillo put forward the notion of puestos sanitarios: health posts staffed by a nurse and 
capable only of emergency hospitalization (Martone, 1951, p.224). In the beginning, Carrillo advocated a policy 
aimed at increasing the numbers in the two bottom tiers: puestos sanitarios and unidades sanitarias. These facilities 
targeted underserved areas, had a smaller financial footprint than the largest urban hospitals, and could be up and 
running relatively quickly.  
In the unidad sanitaria, “each individual and each family must be known, and each intervention by the 
health center must be accurately recorded” (Secretaría de Salud Pública, 1948, p.43). Members of an ideal staff 
included a physician, a tuberculosis expert, a pediatrician, a midwife, and a psychiatrist. The goal of the unidad 
sanitaria was to provide equal time to the curative, prophylactic, and social branches of medicine as envisioned by 
Carrillo. He argued that a combination of all three aspects of medicine was easier for the smaller health centers than 
for the larger hospitals that necessarily concentrated on patients needing curative care (Carrillo, 1949, p.464). At the 
same time, the MSP had a social, cultural, and political mission in mind for the unidades sanitarias. Speaking in 
1950, Ramos revealed: 
It is anticipated, in the immediate future, the development of a stage that will see more plans for social 
services that will make all of the hospitals not only places of patient care and treatment, scientific research, 
prevention, etc. but also a cultural center that extends its actions to the community. There already exist in the 
interior of the country thirty-seven hospitals with movie theaters, and even in the smallest establishments – 
rural hospitals of four beds – a program of cultural extension has been envisioned wherein it is proposed that 
the waiting room can be transformed in the afternoon into a conference room, theater, or classroom. In 
addition, currently under construction are movie theaters and stages for cultural productions and pageants in 
all of the hospitals that care for chronic patients (1950, p.209). 
In theory, the FFYP called for significant hospital construction under the guidance and control of Carrillo. 
Decreto No. 16.242 (June 11, 1947) stated: “All matters concerning hospital facilities, studies, projects, 
construction, rehabilitation, preservation, and improvement that the State faces will be under control of the 
Secretaría de Salud Pública [the immediate precursor to the MSP]” (“Todo lo referente a construcciones 
hospitalarias, 1947, pp.86-87). In practice, the various provincial public health ministries and the FEP joined the 
MSP in hospital construction. 
 
 
             Hospital Beds in Argentina (Ministerio de Salud Pública, 1952, pp.15, 19) 
 
 
 
        1946    1951         % Change 
Ministerio de Salud Pública (MSP): 15,425 27,351 +77% 
Provincial Public Health Ministries: 8,100 23,278 +187% 
Fundación Eva Perón (FEP): 0 18,130 N/A 
Other: 42,775 45,850 +7% 
Total beds: 66,300 114,609     +73% 
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From 1946 to the end of the FFYP in 1951 the number of hospital beds in Argentina increased by 48,309 
(an additional 3 beds per 1,000 inhabitants). However, the dominance of non-MSP institutions undercut the relative 
success suggested by this statistic because the lack of MSP control over the new beds weakened Carrillo’s ability to 
implement or justify a comprehensive, nationalized hospital infrastructure. Fully 69% of the total number of hospital 
beds added between 1946 and 1951 were largely the result of construction by the provincial public health ministries 
and the FEP. Therefore, an important point is that the total number of hospital beds built by the MSP, the FEP, and 
the Peronist-controlled provincial governments were nevertheless under Peronist control but not under the direction 
of Carrillo. The 11,926 beds added by the MSP between 1946 and 1951 were the result of 61 new medical facilities, 
41 of which were unidades sanitarias of less than twenty beds each. Although the latter certainly met the MSP’s 
policy goals of reaching sparsely settled, rural, and underserved communities, the MSP’s two new regional 
hospitals, which between them accounted for nearly 1,000 of the new hospitals beds, had begun as government 
projects before 1946 and were not truly components of Carrillo’s plan (Ministerio de Salud Pública, 1952, p.101). 
Carrillo’s primary problem in hospital construction was that the MSP “was not engaged on a tabula rasa” 
(Ross, 1988, p.137). The provincial governments, the FEP, and the mutualidades – particularly the obras sociales of 
organized labor – competed with the MSP for projects, funding, and political support. Although in 1948 the MSP 
decreed that its hospital program should serve all Argentine citizens and not specific interest groups such as 
members of labor unions, the scarcity of resources dictated that the interior receive priority (Archivos de Salud 
Pública, p.1). The pronouncement also hinted at the fact that during the years of the FFYP the mutualidades and the 
FEP built large urban hospitals targeted to and funded by specific interest groups. Within Peronism writ large – that 
is, Peronism beyond the Peronist state – Carrillo’s efforts lost out to Perón’s and Evita’s interest in delivering social 
justice in the form of hospitals and medical care to the working class and descamisados, sub-national identities that 
were the foundation of Peronist political support. In addition, the significant increase in provincial hospitals 
demonstrated the ability of Peronist provincial governments to resolve public health issues below the federal level 
and closer to the lives of everyday citizens. 
Had Peronism presented a truly national project for the Argentine health care sector, it would have spoken 
with one voice and not suffered from a variety of officially-sanctioned institutions working at cross-purposes. While 
it is not surprising that provincial governments continued to pursue their own policy goals and initiatives despite 
efforts at centralization, the idea that other parts of the Peronist apparatus – particularly the FEP and the unions’ 
hospital construction – subverted Carrillo’s and the MSP’s universalizing plans suggests that, for all its nationalist-
sounding rhetoric and public policy pronouncements, the Peronist project for a “New Argentina” was in some ways 
rhetorical cover for the personal aggrandizement of Perón and Evita through the cultivated support of autonomous 
social groups with clear sub-national identities.  
The history of Peronism’s actions within the health care sector bears out this conclusion, and the result 
certainly reflected not a national, state-led scheme of hospital organization and management but a jumble of medical 
facilities predominantly connected in some way (if only by being named after Perón, Evita, or other key parts of the 
Peronist canon) to Peronism. Indeed, by 1949 all efforts at the nationalization of hospitals had ceased, and in the 
Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) Carrillo retreated significantly from hospital construction. By 1954, the MSP 
actually controlled 2,266 fewer beds than in 1951 (Diarios de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados, 1954, p.57). 
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Hospitals under provincial control had increased by 14,117 to 37,395. The FEP added no more hospitals after 
Evita’s death in 1952 and gave what it had built to the state – but to the Ministry of Labor and not the MSP. 
IV. New Construction 
Although in the end the MSP undertook no construction projects during the execution of the SFYP, 
discussions during the planning stage included the consideration of new hospitals and unidades sanitarias. More 
specifically, on December 3, 1951 Perón made a radio address asking citizens to contribute to the SFYP:  
I want to make a final call to people and institutions – and in a special way to the labor unions – [to] send to 
the President of the Republic your petitions and anxieties so that they may be studied… I want to tell the 
people that not all of the necessary works that you request can possibly be realized, but you will assure that 
the planning – based upon our current information and the requests of the populace itself – will permit us to 
implement a rational and just distribution of the works (1951b). 
The public petitions and subsequent responses reveal the extent of the need for medical facilities in rural 
areas and the manner in which the state adjudicated and accommodated these needs. The MSP granted many 
requests for unidades sanitarias and larger hospitals from regions of political or economic significance. For 
example, Galo Pared, press secretary for the Sindicato Obrero de Oficios Varios in El Zapallar, Province of 
Presidente Perón (present-day Chaco), requested the inclusion in the SFYP of medical facilities originally included 
in the FFYP but as yet not realized: 
The catastrophic loss by our children – participants last year in the ‘EVITA’ Youth Soccer Championship – 
demonstrated the lamentable state of our children’s health. I urge the immediate construction of a hospital as 
well as the nationalization of the emergency room and the designation of a physician for the maternity center. 
This will be the first step toward the decentralization of the caravans of the sick that come daily to the 
emergency room that had to be transformed into a hospital and maternity ward – many times requiring the 
placement of beds in the waiting area because of the lack of space, which leaves a lamentable impression 
(AGN, Legajo 45, No. 13.638). 
One year later, the government noted the inclusion of a hospital construction project in the SFYP in 
response to Pared’s request: 
For the important city of El Zapallar, the most progressive of the northeast of the province, located in the 
center of one of the richest agricultural regions with significant cotton production, support for a project is 
proposed… [to include] the creation of a hospital with a capacity of 120 beds. Today in this city there is only 
a unidad sanitaria without facilities for admitting patients (AGN, Legajo 45, No. 13.638). 
However, the MSP also took into account the need to apply resources in the most efficient way possible. In 
one example, the government denied the request from the Sindicato Obrero de Oficios Varios of Landeta, Province 
of Santa Fe for a hospital. The official response reasoned that the small size of the town (2,000 people) did not 
“justify the construction of a hospital or a ‘rural’ type of facility” (AGN, Legajo 45, No. 9.375). Instead, the 
construction of a hospital in nearby Piamonte would serve the citizens of Landeta. Notably, Piamonte’s request 
came from the local chapter of the Peronist party (the Unidad Básica Peronista). The population of Piamonte (4,000 
inhabitants) justified “the necessity of having a hospital that at the least represents a ‘minimally functional center’ or 
rather a rural hospital of 30 beds, conceived and constructed in a way that can foresee the probable addition to the 
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nearby population and serve other localities that are within its radius of action and region of influence” (AGN, 
Legajo 45, No. 9.678). 
Finally, and in the majority of cases, when responding to requests the MSP had already assumed the 
mindset of a coordinating role for the federal government instead of approving and subsequently funding 
construction. For instance, the Sindicato de Sanidad y Afines in Gualeguaychu, Province of Entre Ríos requested the 
nationalization and modernization of its local hospital (the Policlínico Centenario) as well as the addition of an 
emergency room and a nursing school (AGN, Legajo 47, No. 8.692). The official response noted that while approval 
required further study, the government would follow the overall direction of the SFYP: “Projects of medical care 
will be regulated through the national public health organization in such a way that the management is centralized 
and the execution decentralized under the responsibility of the provinces, municipalities, and unofficial medical care 
entities” (AGN, Legajo 47, No. 8.692). The nationalization of the hospital infrastructure was no longer an option – a 
dramatic change from the FFYP’s proposed 83,000 new hospital beds. 
As noted above, the provincial public health ministries constructed the bulk of new medical facilities 
during the Peronist era. In the province of Santa Fe, this program had begun with the creation of the first provincial 
Ministerio de Salud Pública in 1941. A significant component of Santa Fe’s public health policy was the 
construction of hospitals and unidades sanitarias. As Lazarte documented in 1948: 
For some years in Santa Fe a series of hospitals were created that we could call… regional or rural and all of 
those services were coordinated with a hospital located in Rosario (Hospital Freyre) and another in Santa Fe 
that would provide the function of public health centers with specialists for the region and general 
practitioners for the area. This form of concentrating services in a region or in a big hospital is highly 
beneficial for the organization of public health (p.175). 
In neighboring Entre Ríos, the Dirección General de Salud Pública (General Public Health Board) 
transferred many existing municipal hospitals to provincial control while also constructing new facilities. In March 
1949, the Dirección proudly reported: 
The importance of medical services in our province depends directly on the Dirección General de Salud 
Pública, which includes 47 hospitals, clinics, and emergency rooms with 4,555 beds. Some 410 physicians, 
204 pharmacists, 168 dentists, 28 biochemists, and 51 obstetricians distributed throughout the fourteen 
departamentos [counties] of Entre Ríos practice their professional mission with true zeal and dedication 
making our body of professionals dedicated to healing a one of the most prestigious among the Argentine 
provinces. It will be very difficult today to find even a small population in the entrerriana countryside 
without access to the services of a physician, a pharmacist, or a hospital, clinic, or emergency room” 
(“Reglamentación de la Carrera Médico-Hospitalaria, 1949, p. 5). 
Other than federal or provincial hospital construction, the FEP represented the single largest entity that 
undertook hospital projects in Peronist Argentina; and it was common to refer to it as a “state within the State” (La 
Nación, 1950). Under the guidance of Evita Perón, the FEP invested in large hospitals primarily near concentrations 
of worker housing. FEP-constructed facilities were a way for Peronism to make direct and visible contributions to 
the health and well-being of targeted populations of the working class and descamisados who supported the 
movement. While the MSP spoke of rationality, organization, centralization, and bettering the health of all 
Argentine citizens, FEP hospitals emphasized the love of Perón for the specific group of people for whom the 
facilities and medical services were intended. For example, when inaugurating a children’s hospital in Catamarca, 
the first FEP facility, Evita pronounced:  
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This children’s hospital that today opens its doors and as a guarantee carries the illustrious name of General 
Perón is the living message that the president has wanted to send to all catamarqueños. It is neither the work 
of Perón’s wife nor that of the Fundación de Ayuda Social [FEP]. It is the result of General Perón’s orders 
because under his solitary guidance these monuments for the humble people of this province – so loved by all 
of us – have been built brick by brick (1950a). 
Still, far more important than the initial construction in the interior of the country were the large hospitals 
built in suburban Buenos Aires. The Policlínico “Presidente Perón”, the second FEP-built hospital, consisted of 600 
beds, five wings with five stories, windows for ventilation and sunlight, a reading and research, a pharmacy, a 
laboratory, facilities for cancer treatment, an allergy clinic, up-to-date equipment for X-rays and electrocardiograms, 
ophthalmology, dentistry, orthopedics, ear/nose/throat, surgical facilities and operating theaters. In addition to 
touting these important technical aspects of the hospitals, both Perón and Evita emphasized the “humanizing” aspect 
of FEP-built medical facilities – particularly in contrast to the “inhospitable” ones from previous eras. Upon 
dedicating the Policlínico Presidente Perón in 1951, Perón remarked: “This hospital incarnates the humanization of 
medical care, implanting the true regime of a hospital for workers” (1950). Evita later pointed out to him: 
My general, this isn’t the work of Perón’s wife, this is the work of a handful of men and women that work in 
the Fundación, self-sacrificing and anonymous, in order to collaborate with your patriotic dream of forming a 
socially just, economically free, and politically supreme Argentina. The [FEP] – following the motto of 
General Perón that “better than speaking is doing, and better than promising is fulfilling” – carry out this 
hospital policy from the inspiration of General Perón, who charged us with building the humanized hospitals 
he dreamt of for the Argentine workers. The Fundación fulfilled these dreams because the Fundación was 
born from the Argentine people and because it dearly loves the Nation’s descamisados (1950b). 
At the time, the FEP envisioned the construction of 35 hospitals with 15,000 beds. As noted above, by 1951 
the FEP had constructed hospitals and unidades sanitarias for a total of 18,130 beds. In addition, in August 1951 
and again in 1953 the FEP sponsored a tren sanitario (medical train) to take health care to the underserved interior 
(specifically, the provinces of Santa Fe, Córdoba, Tucumán, Salta, Jujuy, and Formosa). The train included nine cars 
dedicated to gynecology, obstetrics, dentistry, general practice, a laboratory, cardiology, sleeping accommodations, 
food preparation and eating, and movie presentations to the public via a theater car (Campins, Gaggero, & Garro, 
1992, p.83). 
The FEP thought of itself as an outgrowth of worker solidarity and social assistance, and as a consequence 
contributions by workers significantly funded the Fundación’s activities. Mariano Plotkin argues that in spite of its 
funding sources, the FEP was an effort by Peronism to counterbalance the strength of the labor unions. The 
provision of social services was a vital part of constructing the consent of people, and Plotkin remarks: 
 
The FEP provided concrete benefits to the poor, but at the same time it was instrumental in the creation of 
some aspects of the Peronist political imagery. The FEP was perhaps the most visible evidence of the 
accessible and dedicated nature of the government. Moreover, the FEP contributed to the process of the 
politicization of everyday life. Going to an FEP hospital… could be seen as an act of – if not support for – at 
least benevolent neutrality toward the regime… In the context of a society profoundly polarized along the 
lines of “Peronism” and “anti-Peronism,” this was an important achievement (2002, p.192). 
In addition to supporting the FEP’s projects, many labor unions also undertook their own construction 
programs. One major example highlights Perón’s involvement in supporting the efforts of organized labor. The 
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Unión Ferroviaria (UF, the railway workers’ union) began a significant investment in medical facilities for its 
members in 1944. Perón understood that the working class represented the core of his support, and he in turn 
supported their efforts to take control of their own health care needs. At the ground-breaking for the union’s new 
hospital in Puerto Nuevo (suburban Buenos Aires) in 1944, Perón was quite direct about his relationship with labor: 
“To me, the railway workers deserve this [hospital] and much more. They have been loyal to us and we understand 
that loyalty is not one-sided: loyalty is mutual or stops being loyalty” (1944b). Later, in 1954, he revealed a much 
more nuanced understanding of the union’s undertaking: 
We understand that health is the supreme good of life, and as a consequence we dedicate to the people’s 
health our principal programs. It was for this that, in 1944, we thought the enormous mass of Argentine 
railway workers – covering the entire Republic – was found defenseless before illness or threats to their own 
health… In this manner the idea was born whose realization we see crystallized today through the sixty 
facilities for the medical care of members of the Unión Ferroviaria. Equally, we see erected today in the port 
of Buenos Aires one of the best hospitals in the country, placed at the service of the valuable health of our 
people in the sector of the family of the railway workers (1954). 
Perón, when speaking as “we”, clearly did not address members of the UF as the head of the Argentine 
state, president of the federal government, or proxy for Carrillo’s MSP. The Peronist state had not directly financed 
the immense and comprehensive construction of hospitals and unidades sanitarias undertaken by the UF. Instead, 
Perón enacted multiple identities: the leader of the Peronist movement, a sympathetic member of the working class 
for whom the union’s medical facilities were intended, and the ultimate guiding force that made these new hospitals 
possible. The manner in which Perón recognized and aided hospital construction by the UF reflected the personal 
and populist approach so important to the cultivation and maintenance of his political support.  Perón’s rhetoric 
underscored everyone’s understanding that railway workers enjoyed their own hospitals primarily because of 
Perón’s personal will. In this way, Perón could promote the conception of the UF’s hospitals as “homes” exclusively 
set aside by his own determination and resolve to achieve the appropriate level of health care for Argentine workers: 
We have asked, as well, that this hospital be purely and exclusively for railway workers… We want the same 
concept to reign in this hospital that commands the other union hospitals that are being built in the territory of 
the Republic. We don’t want medical care in public hospitals for our workers; we want them to have their 
own hospitals because seeking shelter in a charity hospital isn’t the same as being treated in your own home. 
We want this to be a railway workers’ hospital directed and managed by railway workers and at the service of 
railway workers (1954). 
 
V. Conclusion 
Through his insistence on casting hospitals as homes for specific social groups within Argentine society, 
Perón and Peronism were clearly complicit in the continued strength and autonomy of social groups with clear sub-
national identities within the Argentine health care infrastructure. The expansion of provincial public health and 
hospital networks belied an emphasis on local control and action within Argentina’s federal system. The success of 
the FEP’s hospital construction program demonstrated Perón’s willingness to sacrifice the MSP’s stated goals of 
nationalization and public health for all members of Argentine society in order to deliver directly to the working 
class concrete examples of Peronist largesse and social justice. Finally, the ability of labor unions such as the UF to 
implement a vast scheme for hospitals and unidades sanitarias for its members with the full-fledged and spirited 
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support of Perón unmistakably highlighted the tendency within Peronism to favor its political base while also 
cultivating a diverse set of autonomous social and class-based identities within Argentine society. 
Nevertheless, this support of state-, quasi-state-, and union-led interventions into the health care sector 
clearly undermined the goal of a national hospital infrastructure. After only a few years, it became clear to the Perón 
administration that the implementation of a centralized apparatus for delivering social services to the Argentine 
people potentially jeopardized Perón’s ability to maintain union support (Plotkin, 2002). At the same time, 
organized labor seized the opportunity to obtain medical care that was private, neither state-sponsored nor 
subordinated to the state, and therefore similar to the health care via physicians’ private offices that the upper classes 
and elites in Argentina had always enjoyed (Neri, 1976). In the end, each different sub-national identity, or cell, in 
Argentine society wanted control over its individual portion of the health care sector, and Perón aided in the 
development of such a fractured system despite Peronist rhetoric – via Carrillo and the MSP – concerning a united, 
national approach to health care.  
Two currents explain this seeming contradiction. First, the pragmatics of Peronist rule meant that the cost 
of labor union support was the concession of social and medical services to organized labor. What’s more important, 
the tensions within Peronism also reflected opposing forces at work in Argentine society; and Carrillo’s 
universalizing plans for centralized, state-led medicine and the creation of a national hospital infrastructure 
ultimately yielded to the inertia of Argentine society’s cellular organization.  
This conclusion depends upon recognizing the development of autonomous social groups within Argentine 
society. This process had roots that predated the arrival of Peronism, but it was under its supervision that the 
fragmentation of Argentine society into distinct sub-national identities solidified – at least in the realm of the health 
care sector. In this context, autonomy meant the ability of a social group to deliver a comprehensive portfolio of 
health care services to members with neither the daily involvement of the state (as an “employer” of physicians or 
other medical professionals, “owner” of medical facilities, or “single-payer” of health care fees) nor any explicit 
institutional connections between the group’s health care system and the state’s public health apparatus.  
To be sure, even with the MSP’s minimally-coordinating role, which held true for several decades after 
Perón’s exit from power in 1955, the health care systems of the provinces, municipalities, and mutualidades still 
interacted in important and sometimes pernicious ways with the state. However, the coincidence of Perón’s support 
for union-owned and managed health care systems and his status as political leader of the Argentine state 
subordinated the mutualidades to Peronism – and, therefore, the state – at the time, but Perón’s ouster untethered 
these cellular health care systems from the state. After Perón left, the health care infrastructures and practices put 
into place by social groups under Peronism realized their full potential for autonomy. 
Along with many other historians, Carlos Waisman (1987) argues that members of the working class were 
content with Peronism only so long as their overall welfare improved and the resulting economic surplus could be 
redistributed to them. Indeed, Perón found all of the necessary pieces in the financial strength of Argentina 
following the industrialization of the 1930s and 1940s and its economic success during the Second World War. This 
agreement broke down when the economy stagnated first in 1949 and again in the early 1950s, and because the labor 
unions had been able to maintain control over social services that otherwise could have been under state control, 
labor emerged from the Peronist years as a largely autonomous social group ironically less dependent upon the state 
than before Perón’s project of labor incorporation.  
This interpretation contrasts with that of scholars such as Joel Horowitz (1990), who asserts that unions lost 
autonomy due to Peronist policies. It is certainly true that in the realms of economics and politics, organized labor 
was profoundly subservient to the dictates of Perón. That is not to say that labor blindly followed orders from above; 
Perón and labor unions negotiated systems of power and the relationship between the working class and the state. 
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While organized labor unquestionably lost a certain measure of autonomy in the midst of union collaboration with 
Perón, Horowitz ignores the success of labor unions to maintain, expand, and improve their hegemony over social 
services for members. For example, union mutualidades successfully rebuffed efforts by the state to change their 
pension systems dramatically, and in the health care sector mutualidades built vast networks of hospitals while 
reconfiguring the economic position of medical professionals so that the physician’s private office declined in the 
face of employment at facilities owned and operated by mutualidades. As a result, through the late 1940s and early 
1950s labor unions gradually obtained a measure of autonomy in relation to social services and the health care sector 
that became invaluable once the relationship between the working class and the state changed significantly after 
1955. 
While this autonomy may seem antithetical to Peronism’s project to integrate the working class into 
Argentine society, it nonetheless reveals the subtleties of Perón’s redefinition of citizenship. His emphasis on the 
“social dimension of citizenship” necessarily drew attention to issues of health and the provision of medical services 
while also opening the door to the state’s responsibility to organize and centralize the delivery and management of 
such services. That said, although Peronism did recognize the need for social rights and reform, Perón’s support of 
hospital construction and the provision of social services by labor unions is an example of how the Peronist state 
willingly ceded social rights and responsibilities to autonomous social groups with clearly articulated sub-national 
identities – of which labor unions are the best examples. While the rhetoric and policies of Peronism reframed 
citizenship and membership in Argentine society as a bundle of political, social, and economic rights, Peronism 
nevertheless frequently withheld or toned down state involvement in addressing some of the features of this newly-
conceived vision. As a result, the true legacy of Perón’s vision of Argentine identity was its articulation as 
membership in an autonomous social group rather than citizenship in a social welfare state where the nation-state 
delivers such services itself. 
VI. Epilogue 
Developments in the health care sector under Peronism were part of a welfare state stage in the 
development of health care in Argentina. Some, like Belmartino (1991, 2005) and Tobar (2001) have labeled 
Peronist Argentina the “Compromise State” because its “predisposition to incorporate new actors in the debate over 
public policy” led to negotiation that required “the inclusion of modern technical models in the management of the 
state” (Tobar 2001, p.8). After 1955, the Argentine state focused on development, and a “policy of transfer” shifted 
state investment and management of health care from the federal government to the provinces (Belmartino 1991, 
p.18). Beginning in 1957, previously national networks of hospitals fell under the control of provincial governments, 
which, despite the effective withdrawal of the federal government from the health care sector, nevertheless oversaw 
a growth in bureaucracy and state involvement in health care through provinces and municipalities (Tobar 2001, 
Rossi & Rubilar 2007). When Perón returned to power in the early 1970s, he proposed a national health care system, 
and in the early 1980s President Raúl Alfonsín made a similar effort. Both proposals met fatal resistance from 
entrenched interests. In the 1990s, the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus led to a preference for 
further deregulation and decentralization (Perrone & Teixidó 2007, p.5). 
Three main segments have constituted Argentina’s health care sector since 1955: obras sociales (essentially 
the mutualidades of Peronist Argentina), private health plans, and public hospitals. 
Obras Sociales: In 1956, the federal government reformed labors laws to require unions to create separate 
organizations for the provision of social services in an effort to restrict the unions’ ability to use dues for political 
purposes, a reform that resulted in the creation of obras sociales as entities distinct from yet related to labor unions 
(Rossi & Rubilar 2007, p.11). In 1967, the Comisión Nacional de Obras Sociales was created to regulate these 
  
Cells in the Body Politic  
Volume 3, No. 1 (2012) |  ISSN 2161-6590 (online)  |  DOI 10.5195/hcs.2012.100|  http://hcs.pitt.edu  
128 
 
 
 
organizations through the active involvement of state officials, union leaders, and beneficiaries. Subsequent reforms 
also shifted the flow of premiums from laborers to the obras sociales from the unions to the state.  
Private Health Plans: Despite the changes in health care in Peronist Argentina, wealthy elites and members 
of the upper-middle class had continued to access health care by paying for it out of pocket. While these pudientes 
(those would, “could” pay) did not need group schemes like those of the Peronist-era mutualidades, a private sector 
initially configured as pre-payment soon emerged. These plans were – and continue to be – sold by the hospitals and 
clinics themselves. In 1955, the Centro Médico Pueyrredón started the first private health plan in Argentina. It was 
based upon U.S. models and covered medical care at its own facility in Buenos Aires. In 1963, Sanatorio 
Metropolitano introduced a similar private health care plan for patients seeking care at its medical facilities. 
Between 1961 and 1980, 60 private health plans linked to private hospitals and clinics entered the Argentine health 
care sector. Between 1981 and 1990, an additional 57 appeared in part as a result of financial crises that weakened 
the ability of the obras sociales to provide services for its members at the same level of care as in decades before 
(Tobar 2001, p.20). Since the 1980s, many people have supplemented their medical coverage through obras sociales 
with private plans. 
Public Hospitals: As noted above, beginning in 1957 the federal government divested itself of its hospitals, 
and the provincial and municipal governments gradually embraced a decentralized approach to the provision of 
health to members of the public neither covered by obras sociales nor for whom the purchase of a private health 
plan was an option. The reforms of the 1990s instituted user fees for medical services at public hospitals, but these 
institutions continue to provide services not only to the uninsured but also to beneficiaries of obras sociales or 
private health plans. Indeed, insured people often make use of public hospitals for more complex and expensive 
treatments and surgeries. Cavagnero et al note that, “in principle, hospitals should be refunded by the obras sociales 
for these particular services, but in practice they are hardly reimbursed” (2006, 9). 
One’s place in the current structure of Argentina’s health care sector depends partly upon sub-national and 
class identities – much as it would under Peronism. Today, obras sociales cover most of the employed, the private 
health plans insure elites and members of the upper-middle and working classes who can afford to do so, and the 
public hospitals serve everyone else. With the addition since 1955 of a large and diverse private sector, health care 
in Argentina is even more fragmented than it was under Peronism with no change in sight. As Perrone and Teixidó 
argue: “The fragmentation and inequity of the system are in place and are a challenge to the country’s institutions” 
(2007, p.46). Given its long-standing disjointed character, the history of Argentina’s health care sector reveals a 
cellular society in which sub-national identities continue to shape access to health care.  
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